First Circuit Upholds Time Served Sentence in Win for Accused: Vinas, 23-1446

Vinas Pleads Guilty to Offenses Around Murder-For-Hire, Gets Time Served

Vinas was implicated in a murder-for-hire case. Undercover officers, working on a tip, contacted Vinas, who indicated that he wanted someone to kill two people for unpaid construction work. Vinas and the undercover met several times to discuss the matter and Vinas paid two deposits as well as showing proof that he had the rest of the money available. Vinas was subsequently arrested by law enforcement.

Vinas pled guilty to "using facilities of interstate commerce in the commission of murder-for-hire." The government agreed to recommend a sentence of ten years, which was within the sentencing range of punishment.

The Government asked for ten years in their sentencing memorandum, citing the need for deterrence. Vinas asked for time served indicating that he had been diagnosed with a depressive disorder while in pretrial custody. Vinas also submitted 49 letters of support.

The district court indicated that while the offense was one of the most serious that the court had seen in its 12 years, the court had little doubt that Vinas would never commit a crime like this again and indicated that the court did not believe in a theory of general deterrence. The court referenced the letters that had been received. Ultimately the court sentenced him to time served. The government appealed.

First Circuit Holds That The Sentence is Appropriate and That 3553(a) Factors Don't Require Equal Weight

The court indicated that the government preserved error generally speaking by asking for a longer sentence that Vinas received. But the government also argued that the district court erred when the court ignored general deterrence or creating a disparity in sentence. The court determined that the test for that would thus be plain error, but in any event, the court determined that the government waived the disparity and deterrence arguments.

The government also argued that the sentences were substantively unreasonable. The court disagreed indicating that there was no basis that only a longer sentence would be defensible. The First Circuit also indicated that they did not see "how that conclusion is necessarily so outside "the expansive universe of defensible sentences."

The prosecutors also indicated that the district court put to much weight on the mitigating factors such as family ties and community circumstances. But the court indicated that they have previously affirmed below guidelines sentences based on these factors. The court also indicated that they did not have to give each of the 3553a factors equal weight:

"Sentencing courts are not required, however, to 'afford each of the section 3553(a) factors equal prominence. The relative weight of each factor will vary with the idiosyncratic circumstances of each case, and the sentencing court is free to adapt the calculus accordingly.'"

Ultimately the First Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court. Vinas, 23-1446